Direct Discrimination
Direct discrimination occurs where A treats B less favourably (on grounds of religion or belief) than they would treat others in circumstances which are materially the same. Direct discrimination cannot be justified: there is no defence of reasonableness. The claimant must prove facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that unlawful discrimination has occurred. If the claimant makes such a prima facie case, then the burden of the proof passes to the respondent.
Direct discrimination claims are seldom successful. In most cases, they fail because the actions of the defendant are not on grounds of religion. An example of this can be found in
Ladele.
To remind you of the facts of the case: Ladele, a Registrar, refused on grounds of conscience to perform civil partnership ceremonies. When Islington Council insisted that she should undertake at least some of these duties and disciplined her, threatening her with dismissal, she alleged that she had suffered discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.
Although the original Employment Tribunal concluded that the claimant had suffered direct and indirect discrimination and harassment on grounds of religion or belief, both the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal have held that the Tribunal had erred in law and substituted a finding of no discrimination.
Focussing upon the claim of direct discrimination, the EAT noted that the crucial question for the Tribunal to determine was the reason why the claimant was treated as she was. In order to establish discrimination on a prohibited ground (such as religion or belief), the Tribunal must be satisfied that the prohibited ground is one of the significant reasons for the treatment. The EAT found that the Tribunal had confused the claimant's reasons for acting as she did (which were on grounds of religion) with the council's reasons for treating the claimant as they did (which were on grounds of her conduct not her belief).
The Court of Appeal agreed that the focus of the enquiry was why the direct discrimination occurred. 9 The 'explanation given by the employer for the less favourable treatment' must be Both the Court of Appeal and the EAT held that there had been a disadvantage but that it had been justified. The Court of Appeal held that the Council's actions had a legitimate aim:
through its Dignity for All policy 'Islington wished to ensure that all their registrars were designated to conduct, and did conduct, civil partnerships as they regarded this as consistent with their strong commitment to fighting discrimination, both externally, for the benefit of the residents of the borough, and internally in the sense of relations with and between their employees'.
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It was also proportionate. The Court of Appeal quoted the EAT's statement that 'the only way in which they could have achieved that aim was by requiring all their registrars to conduct civil partnerships'. 21 The Court of Appeal held: 'the aim of the Dignity for All policy was of general, indeed overarching, policy significance to Islington, and it also had fundamental human rights, equality and diversity implications, whereas the effect on Ms
Ladele of implementing the policy did not impinge on her religious beliefs: she remained free to hold those beliefs, and free to worship as she wished'. 22 Further, Ladele was employed in a public job and was being 'required to perform a purely secular task, which was being treated as part of her job'.
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The argument here does seem a trifle one-sided. Surely Dignity for All protects discrimination on grounds of religion as well as sexual orientation? There seems to be no recognition of this. Preventing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is described as being of 'overarching, policy significance' whilst freedom of religion is defined very narrowly. which were 'difficult to square with the supposed fundamental character of the rights'.
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The application of the specific situation rule renders Article 9 impotent allowing other Convention rights to 'trump' it with ease. The Court of Appeal decision in Ladele provides the clearest evidence of this to date. The Court of Appeal noted that these Article 9 judgments provided a 'contrast' to other Strasbourg decisions 42 which emphasized that 'where sexual orientation is in issue, there is a need for particularly convincing and weighty reasons to justify a difference in treatment regarding rights falling within article 8'. 43 In other words, whilst the protection provided by Article 9 is weak, the protection provided by Article 8 is strong.
Religious Exceptions
Although we are going to deal with the question of religious exceptions in depth in the next session, it might be wise to note of the treatment given of the current exceptions by the Court of Appeal decision in Ladele.
The Court of Appeal considered the exception given to religious groups to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation in the field of employment. 44 The Court of Appeal stated that this exception 'identifies the relatively limited circumstances in which it is permissible to discriminate against anyone on grounds of sexual orientation on grounds of religion or belief'.
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Of interest here is the fact that the Court of Appeal sought to stress the narrow scope of the exceptions. Moreover, although it is frankly unsurprising that the Court held that the exception did not apply to Ladele, the tenor of the judgment is still noteworthy. 
Conclusions
It should be rather clear by now that I am uneasy as to some of the reasoning in the Ladele case but why should this matter what are the wider implications of the judgment?
First, it is worth noting that together with Eweida (which concerned a much narrower argument) Ladele is the highest authority we have on religion or belief discrimination law.
The judgment and reasoning is thus likely to be influential.
In relation to direct discrimination, I do not doubt for a second that the decision is correct.
And hopefully this will lead to a more prudent use of the direct discrimination provisions. A tendency to argue 'everything but the kitchen sink' undermines the worth of the argument and is off-putting to the decision-maker. However, there seems to be a degree of hostility towards religious claims. Would the comments about not making remarks out of context appear in sex discrimination claim or a race discrimination claim? The focus purely upon the motive of the discriminator seems to create a rather large hurdle.
In relation to indirect discrimination, I am uneasy at how the laudable aim of preventing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is used to annihilate the claim of religious discrimination. The one-sided nature of the argument is buttressed by a now well-established but ultimately flawed narrow interpretation of Article 9. This is particularly regrettable in the case of Ladele where it is arguable that the specific situation rule ought not to apply at all.
Not all marriage registrars instantly became civil partnership registrars so how can it be argued that she voluntarily agreed to this, bearing in mind she was appointed when the law and social mores were very different to the current situation? I also find it of concern how the fact that Ladele had been willing to carry out other functions outside her contract was used against her.
I think the tenor and reasoning in Ladele is more important than the decision. And the tenor and reasoning is important for anyone -religious or not -who considers freedom of thought, conscience and religion to be an important right. I am not saying that the 'religion or belief' argument always needs to win but I am saying that it needs to be considered seriously and treated as being as important as other rights. And I'm not sure that is the case at the moment.
